I Introduction
By the early eighties, after nearly two terms in Congress, Senator Pete W. Domenici (R-NM) had made a name for himself. "He was a gray, pragmatic fiscal and social conservative who opposed abortion, gun control and same-sex marriage and supported school vouchers, tax cuts and mandatory three-strikes sentencing. He was no bleeding heart, no cause pleader." While the coalition failed in passing legislation, their union did succeed in illustrating that a legislator's family members may influence his legislative decision making. The idea that family, in particular children like Domenici's daughter Clare, can influence parental behavior seems to accord with common sense. Yet, it is a concept that has been neglected by the literature on congressional voting behavior. This literature has established that political party, constituent preferences and a legislator's personal preferences and/or characteristics are all significant predictors of a legislator's voting pattern. (See for example Levitt 1996 .) Personal preferences or characteristics are particularly important in explaining voting on moral issues. Ansolabehere et. al (2001) and Snyder and Groseclose (2000) have found that members of the United States Congress are subject to less party pressure and are therefore more free to vote their own views on issues of civil rights, gun control and abortion. In Britain, Hibbing and Marsh (1987) show that partisan forces are much weaker on so called "free votes," which "frequently deal with controversial issues, such as abortion, capital punishment, homosexuality, and the like." More influential on these controversial decisions are legislator personal characteristics such as religion, age and education. However, the potential impact of family, in particular the gender mix of a legislator's children, on his or her decision making has not been explored. 3 This paper begins to fill this hole in the literature, asking whether children can influence their congressional parent's behavior, just as previous work has shown that neighbors, peers, parents and siblings can impact behaviors from educational attainment 4 to welfare takeup (Bertrand et. al 2000) to wedding a working woman (Fernandez et. al 2004) .
Sociologists have demonstrated a link between offspring gender and parental beliefs on not only parenting issues (Brody and Steelman 1985; Downey, Jackson and Powell 1994) but also on issues of political significance. Warner (1991) examines the impact of daughters on parental attitudes toward women in Detroit and Toronto. She divides parents into three groups: those who parent only daughters, those who parent both daughters and sons and those who parent only sons.
She finds that women who parent only daughters in both countries and men who parent only daughters in Canada are significantly more likely to hold feminist views than those who parent only sons. Warner and Steel (1999) find that US parents who parent only daughters have increased support for feminist policies (pay equity, comparable worth, affirmative action in regards to gender and Title IX) over those who parent a mixture of daughters and sons. US fathers who parent both daughters and sons show increased feminist sympathies over those fathers who parent only sons. 5 3 Note that there is a long literature considering the impact of parents' political attitudes on their offspring. See for example Jennings and Niemi (1974) . 4 Recent examples are Black et. al (2005) , Dahl and Lochner (2005) , Hanushek et. al (2003) , Hoxby (2000) , Ruhm (2004) and Sacerdote (2007) . 5 Two recent papers demonstrate that child gender can affect parental decisions surrounding marriage, divorce and custodial arrangements (Ananat and Michaels 2006 and Moretti 2004) .
The shift in fathers' attitudes is particularly interesting given the "gender gap" in political beliefs in this country: a larger fraction of women than men favor the Democratic Party (Edlund and Pande 2002) . 6 Further, women appear more liberal based on their responses to survey questions. Women are slightly more likely to believe abortion should be legally available. (Fortyfour percent of women and forty-two percent of men agree with that statement.) Amongst adults in the top third of the income distribution the gender difference grows to nine percentage points (55% vs 46%). Amongst college graduates the gap is 12 percentage points (60% vs 48%).
Outside of reproductive rights, we see large gender differences in political views in the aggregate. 7 Women are four percentage points more likely to favor more crime spending (61% vs 57%), five percentage points less likely to favor increased defense spending (20% vs 25%) and eleven percentage points more likely to support laws protecting homosexuals from discrimination (68% vs 57%) and to believe that there should be more government services (41% vs 30%).
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I take the sociological evidence of parental attitudinal shift on women's issues resulting from raising daughters (versus sons) to the political arena to ask whether parenting females increases a United States Representative's propensity to vote liberally on women's issues bills.
The answer is yes. Using congressional voting record scores compiled by the American Association of University Women (AAUW) and the National Organization of Women (NOW), I
find that, conditional on total children parented, each female child parented is associated with a score increase that is approximately one quarter of the difference in score accounted for by a congressperson's own gender. By turning to the universe of roll call votes, I demonstrate that the 6 The "gender gap" in Edlund and Pande (2002) terminology has been increasing since the late 1960's. Before this time women voted more conservatively than men. 7 Significant gender differences on these political beliefs also hold within the high educated and high income subgroups. 8 Author's calculations using the 1992-2000 National Election Studies. T-tests show that the gender differences on views on crime, defense, protection of homosexuals, public services and abortion (for the high educated and high income groups) are significant at the 1% level. Gender differences on abortion for the aggregate adult population are significant the 10% level.
realm of influence of female children extends across a variety of issues, but is most consistent and most prevalent on reproductive rights. This work will remain silent on the mechanism by which children shape their parent's voting behavior. While the study is motivated by research which suggests an attitudinal shift arises from parenting daughters, alternative explanations are possible. For example, parenting daughters may increase the cost of voting conservatively on reproductive rights legislation. The increased cost could stem from the embarrassment of a visibly pregnant daughter (due to lesser access to abortion) or the monetary hardship of an unwanted grandchild. 9 Separating a "true" preference shift from a cost-based change in voting patterns is beyond the scope of this study.
And in fact, the distinction does not seem particularly meaningful given the evidence of the applicability of cognitive dissonance to the political arena, where it has been shown that the act of voting influences political beliefs (Mullainathan and Washington 2005) .
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II I summarize the data and methods. I present results demonstrating the impact of child gender on legislator parents' voting behavior in Section III. Section IV concludes.
II Data and Methodology
9 The cost story would have to be combined with some cost for inconsistency (either dissonance or lower probability of reelection) to explain the significant daughter coefficient on votes which concern abortion overseas and in federal prisons. 
Theoretical Foundation for Empirical Strategy
From the work of Warner and Steel (1999) we know that amongst parents, parenting only daughters increases support for feminist policies over parenting a mixture of daughters and sons which increases support for feminist policies over parenting only sons. Moving to the congressional arena I hypothesize that this shift in beliefs translates to a shift in behaviors. I
hypothesize that parenting daughters (versus sons) shifts voting behavior on women's issues in a more liberal direction.
The experiment implied by the theory is the following: A congress person has a child.
Nature randomly assigns the child gender. The comparison is between two congress people each with one additional child; nature assigns the first a boy and nature assigns the second a girl. The difference in voting behavior between the two congress people would yield an estimate of the daughter effect.
To approximate this experiment in the data I run
where Y is a legislator's voting record score or a dummy for voting liberally on an individual roll call vote. GIRLS is the number of daughters that the individual legislator parents and γ is a set of fixed effects for total number of children. 14,15,16 Assuming parents are not following a fertility stopping rule as I argue below, β 1 identifies the impact on voting of parenting an additional 14 The number of children ranges from 0 to 12. Results are robust to the exclusion of congress persons without children. Twelve to fourteen percent of congress people in a congress have no children. 15 I have also tried entering the number of female children non-linearly. I present the linear specification because of its better fit. Results presented are robust to entering total number of children linearly. 16 The names of legislators' children are published in the Congressional Directory. In cases where the names of the children were ambiguous (with regard to gender) or omitted I consulted Internet resources, phoned the member's office (if s/he were still in office) or phoned a newspaper in the member's district.
daughter (as compared to an additional son). Conditioning on total number of children is crucial for identifying this parameter of interest. Failure to include these child fixed effects would yield a coefficient on β 1 which combines both the impact of parenting an additional daughter and the impact of parenting an additional child. Just as in the educational peer effects literature where quality and quantity of children in the classroom have differing effects on educational attainment, the act of parenting an additional child may have its own impact on congressional voting behavior.
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Conditioning on total number of children, the number of female children and the number of male children are linearly dependent. Therefore I cannot discern whether voting behavior is driven by more contact with daughters or less contact with sons or a combination of the two.
Therefore β 1 should be interpreted as the relative impact of daughters, as compared to sons.
I expand Equation 1 to include controls that previous literature has shown to be associated with legislative voting. Thus using any one of the four outcomes outlined above, I run regressions of the form
As shown in 
Identifying Assumptions
The identification strategy is predicated on the assumption that conditional on number of children, the number of female children is a random variable. This assumption must be defended.
While it is unlikely that a representative could choose the gender of any individual child, 21 it is possible that a representative could follow a fertility stopping rule that would impact the proportion of female children he or she parents. For example, as laid out in Clark (2000), consider a society with two types of couples. Couples of Type I have strong son preferences. They ideally would like three children, but will continue having children until they have at least three children and at least two sons. Couples of Type II also ideally would like three children. They have no gender preference. So they will continue having children until they have three children. 22 In such a society there will be a correlation between son preference and child gender mix, conditional on number of children. Amongst couples with three children, for example, those with one boy will be those without a gender preference while those with two or three boys will be a mixture of 19 Party, service length and age can all be found in the Congressional Directory. Religion data come from three sources: the Congressional Directory, the Almanac of American Politics and http://www.adherents.com/adh_Congress.html. 20 Results are robust to the inclusion of marital status dummies. However, I do not include these controls in my basic specification for three reasons: 1) There is no theoretical foundation from previous literature for such an inclusion. 2) Endogeneity of the marital decision would result in a biased coefficient. 3) There is little variation in marital status. 21 With a mean age of 52 in 1997 these individuals on average did not have access to technology for fetal sex selection at the time of the gestation of their children. There are no natural methods of intercourse timing that have a significant impact on child sex (Wilcox et. al 1995) . The possibility of selecting sex through adoption does remain, however. Thus I rely on the premise that legislators are not practicing some type of sex selection.
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The issue of whether constituents are selecting representatives in a manner correlated with child gender is addressed in Appendix Table 2 and again in the results section. The results of Appendix 23 Using the gender of the first born to instrument for the final gender mix proves uninformative due to large standard errors which are the result, at least in part, of the reduction in sample size, in the case of the 108 th Congress, from 433 members (for whom I can establish the gender of all children) to 227 members (for whom I can establish the gender of the first born child). 24 There does remain the possibility that a congress person with male preferences may distance himself from his female children, mentally or even physically as suggested by recent work documenting the correlation between marital dissolution and female children (Ananat and Michaels 2005; Bedard and Deschenes 2004; and Dahl and Moretti 2004) . However, such behavior would merely bias my findings toward zero as a portion of the "treated" sample would not actually be receiving the treatment. Even in specifications controlling for district characteristics, there remains the possibility of selection on unobserved variables. However, this seems unlikely given that for selection to bias results, it would have to be the case that candidates who assume a liberal stance on reproductive rights are more likely to be elected if they have more daughters (or candidates with more daughters are more likely to be elected if they take a more liberal stance on reproductive rights)
whereas candidates who assume a conservatives stance on reproductive rights are more likely to be elected if they have more sons (or candidates with more sons are more likely to be elected if they take a more conservative stance on reproductive rights).
Thus I assume that child gender can be thought of as random and estimate models of the form of Equation 2 to identify the impact of child gender on parental voting behavior.
III Basic Results
A legislator's propensity to vote liberally on women's issues is increasing in the number of female children parented. This relationship can be seen clearly in graphical form using the voting record scores of either of the women's interest groups: NOW or AAUW (for any of our focal congresses). Figure 1 average NOW score that is nine points higher than those with no daughters. Those with two daughters have an average score that is an additional 18 points higher than those with one.
Democrats are pictured to the right of all legislators. While their NOW scores are higher than average, the basic pattern still holds. The increase for one daughter over none is four points and for two daughters over one is ten points. Republicans, with lower NOW scores than average, again show a similar pattern. The average NOW score is seven points higher for one daughter compared with those with none. The marginal increase for the second daughter is two points.
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Three is the second most popular number of children for this population. The bottom half of the figure presents the analysis for legislators with three children. Once again for legislators overall and for Democrats the mean NOW score increases with each additional female child. For
Republicans the pattern is not quite as clear. The mean score is greater for those with three daughters over those with one daughter over those with no daughters. However, those with two daughters break the trend. This group has the lowest mean NOW score amongst Republicans with three children.
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The positive relationship between parenting daughters and voting liberally on women's issues is robust to the inclusion of additional controls. Congress, the number of female children coefficient is significantly different from zero at conventional levels. While that two point increase may seem small relative to the standard deviations of these scores, note that the female legislators, on average, score a significant seven to ten points higher on these rating scores. In other words, an additional daughter has about 25% of the impact on women's issues that one's own gender has. Table 3 for the coefficients on the child fixed effects.) While this relationship has not been shown in previous literature, it is not surprising given that congress people from districts that voted Republican in the most recent presidential election have significantly more children, on average, than those from districts that voted Democratic. In the B columns of Appendix Table 3 I show results from models of equation 2 where I fail to control for number of children and conflate the influence of an additional child with that of an additional daughter. This combined daughter/child coefficient is not significantly related to legislative voting suggesting that number of daughters and number of children may have equal and opposite 27 Both results are consistent across four of five specifications.
impacts. However, we cannot interpret the coefficient from this specification causally as number of children is an endogenous choice variable.
Turning attention to subgroups of representatives, I demonstrate in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 that male legislators show an increase in voting record score for each female child, an effect that is significant in fourof five specifications; female representatives, in four of five specifications, show an in insignificant decrease. (In Table 3 each cell presents the coefficient on the variable Number of Female Children from a different regression.) However, due to the imprecise nature of the female children coefficient in the female representative regressions, no conclusions can be drawn about the impact of female children on the voting behavior of female representatives. In the remainder of the paper, I will at times refer to the influence of daughters on their legislator "fathers" rather than their legislator "parents" for this reason.
Scores are increasing in female children for both Democratic and Republican House members. However, the difference is not statistically significant. In fact, comparing coefficients from decile regressions, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the impact of female children on women's issue voting is the same throughout the voting record score distribution.
Decomposition of Results
The term "women's issues" is vague. For example the NOW score is composed of issues in seven topic areas: equality, reproductive rights, safety, economic security, education, lesbian rights and health. On which issues is there a connection between parenting daughters and legislative voting? To begin to address this question, I decompose the NOW voting record score into its twenty component votes in order to investigate on which issue we see the greatest association between female children and voting patterns. 28 The answer, shown in Table 4 , is reproductive rights. In this table, each row presents the coefficient on Number of Female Children from a regression of the form of Equation 2 in which the outcome variable is a dummy indicating 28 Again, the NOW decomposition is shown because of the greater number of votes on which the score is based.
whether the legislator voted in accordance with the NOW position on this piece of legislation.
The largest contributors legislation-wise to the 2.3 point increase in voting record associated with each female child are the votes on reproductive rights. The average propensity to vote along with the NOW position on these bills increases from 3.0 percentage points (for a bill to withhold funds from the FDA to review drugs that induce medical abortions) to 4.9 percentage points (for a bill requiring parental consent for teens to obtain prescription contraception). The propensity to vote with NOW on each reproductive issue increases an average of 3.8 percentage points with each female child. The average increase across the remaining votes is only 1.5 percentage points.
While more than half of reproductive rights legislation voting is significantly correlated with number of daughters, only two pieces of legislation outside of the reproductive rights area show significant correlations. (Descriptions of the legislation that comprise the NOW score are found in Appendix Table 4 .)
Further evidence that the effect is coming through reproductive rights legislation as well as evidence that findings are not driven by the liberal agenda of NOW and AAUW, comes from examining the impact of daughters on a legislator's National Right to Life Committee voting record score. In specifications akin to those in Table 2 , I find that parenting daughters has a significant impact on NRLC score for all four focal Congresses. 29 Each additional daughter is associated with about a 2-4 point movement in the more liberal direction. This effect is significant in three of four congresses. And once again, the increase for parenting an additional daughter, is about 25% of the effect of own gender.
To create their voting record scores, NOW, AAUW and NRLC selected only a tiny fraction of the hundreds of roll call votes taken each congress. While it is unlikely that selection methods are a function of the degree to which legislators with daughters voted in accordance with their position, it is possible that their method was based on a function of some other characteristic of the legislation. Snyder (1992) Figure 2 summarizes the results by issue type. 34 The boxes show the fraction of votes in which daughters positively and significantly 35 predict a liberal vote, by substantive area. The bounds around these fractions provide the 95% confidence interval.
(The exact fraction significant, standard error and sample size can be found in Table 5 .) Two facts immediately stand out. First, daughters predict liberal voting on reproductive rights far more often than for any other category, a difference which is significant against all other categories. 30 Of the 16 that actually were votes as opposed to the four bills which never made it to a vote for which NOW awarded points for sponsorship. 31 Lopsided (close) defined as more (less) than 65% on the winning side as in Snyder and Groseclose (2000) . 32 Roll call voting data for all Congresses are available at http://voteview.com/dwnl.htm. 33 There were 4583 roll call votes taken across these four years. This definition requires restricting attention to only those votes in which the majority of Democrats opposed the majority of Republicans or only 2180 votes. However, the basic pattern of results is robust to a focus on the all non near-unanimous (90% or more voting one way) votes. 34 Coding of roll call votes comes from Rohde (1953 Rohde ( -2004 . I altered his coding in the following manner: 1) I collapsed categories 2) I used the Congressional Quarterly Weekly website to recode as reproductive rights those votes that contained the keywords abortion, birth control, contraceptive, family values or fetus in the description of the primary issue that the legislation concerned and 3) Appropriations were moved from the appropriations category to the substantive category when they fit in one substantive category. 35 At the 90% confidence level or better.
Secondly, daughters predict liberal voting for the majority of voting categories more often than the ten percent we would expect due to chance. The fraction significant is significantly different from .10 for reproductive rights, defense, foreign policy, economic, environment, government operations, campaigns and elections, social services, health, and labor. The fraction is not significantly different from .10 for symbolic, crime, energy, agriculture, transportation, miscellaneous and miscellaneous appropriations. 36 Hence Figure 2 demonstrates that parenting daughters increases liberal voting generally, but has the most impact on issues concerning reproductive rights. Table 6 However, for only one other issue category-government operations/civil rights-is the pattern as consistent as for reproductive rights. For both issue groups the number of daughters positively and significantly predicts a liberal vote more often than we would expect by chance in three of four congresses. (However, the fraction significant for reproductive rights is 2-3 times that for government operations/civil rights for the 105 th to 107 th Congresses.) Across congresses, parenting daughters increases liberal voting generally, but has the most impact on issues concerning reproductive rights.
Why are votes on reproductive rights particularly influenced by parenting female children? For two reasons, I hypothesize. First, reproductive rights is generally thought of as precisely a women's issue. Unlike lesbian rights which focuses on a subset of the female population or economic security which focuses on a group that includes females and males, the focus of reproductive rights is exactly the female population. It is likely when a congressperson confronts a vote on reproductive rights, he or she thinks that this is a vote that will impact females. For parents of daughters, the issue then takes on "increased salience" (Warner and Steel 1999) .
A second reason that reproductive rights voting is more greatly tied to daughters than other legislative issues is that reproductive rights is a moral issue. In this country, Ansolabehere et. al (2001) and Snyder and Groseclose (2000) find that political parties exhibit less influence on a congress person's voting on moral and religious matters (in comparison with other issues). In Britain, Hibbing and Marsh (1987) show that partisan forces are much weaker on so called "free votes," which "frequently deal with controversial issues, such as abortion, capital punishment, homosexuality, and the like". 37 More influential on these controversial decisions are legislator personal characteristics such as religion, age and education. The decomposition results suggest that the relevant characteristics extend to the familial.
The fact that a legislator's propensity to vote liberally is increasing in number of daughters, particularly in the area of reproductive rights, speaks to the importance of children in shaping parents behavior, much in the way we have come to understand that peers, neighbors, parents and siblings affect an individual's attitudes and actions. However, the question of to what extent this propensity is captured by the constituency remains. Given that sixty percent of selfreported voters failed to identify even one of their districts' candidates for the House of Representatives just weeks after the election, 38 it seems unlikely that voters are aware of the gender composition of candidate's children. Nonetheless, there exists the possibility that voters are aware of a candidate's liberal leanings and select their representatives accordingly. The two facts remain: First, the fact that in 9 of 16 categories we see a larger fraction of significant daughters coefficients than we would expect due to chance, tell us that the propensity to vote liberally on a variety of issue types is increasing in number of daughters. Second, the fact that for reproductive rights the fraction significant is significantly larger than any other category tells us that the daughters' influence is greatest in the reproductive rights arena. The evidence suggests that family, more specifically child gender, is a significant influence in legislator voting behavior.
IV. Conclusion
While the notion that a legislator's children influence his/her voting behavior appears commonsensical, there has, to this point and to my knowledge, been no evidence to quantitatively substantiate this intuition. This paper begins to fill this hole in the literature. I find that parenting an additional female child increases a representative's propensity to vote liberally, particularly on reproductive rights. Such a voting pattern does not seem to be explained away by constituency preferences, suggesting that not only does parenting daughters affect preferences, but also that personal preferences affect legislative behavior. 38 Author's calculations using National Election Study data for the years 1992-2000. 39 The basic pattern of results is robust to replacing state fixed effects with state opinions (from the NES) on abortion, crime, defense, gay rights and social services. Note: All specifications include regional and number of children fixed effects. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 1 The omitted religious category is Protestant. 2 Sample size varies due to missing child gender and voting score information. .82 (1.32) [226] Note: All specifications include legislator race, gender, party, service length (and its square) and age (and its square), number of child, religion and region fixed effects and percent of two party district vote in favor of the most recent Democratic presidential candidate. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Sample size in brackets. Note: All specifications include Democratic vote share of major party vote in 1996 presidential election as well as legislator race, gender, party, age, age squared, service length, square of service length, and religion, child number and region fixed effects. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Sample size in brackets. 1 NOW awards five points per vote/sponsorship in agreement in their position. The A columns show the fraction of votes for which a regression of liberal voting on number of daughters and covariates yields a positive significant coefficient (at the 10% level or lower) on daughters. Standard error is shown in parenthesis. Sample size is in brackets. The B columns provide the results of a test of equality of the fraction in Column A and .10. The C columns provide the results of a test of equality of the row fraction with the fraction for reproductive E n e r g y E n v i r o n m e n t G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t io n s C a m p a ig n s a n d E le c ti o n s C r i m e S o c ia l S e r v ic e s H e a l th A g r i c u l tu r e T r a n s p o r t a t i o n L a b o r M is c e ll a n e o u s M is c e ll a n e o u s A p p r o p r i a ti o n s 35 APPENDIX th Congress, for whom gender of the first born could be established. Number of children regressions include controls for legislator race, gender, party, age, age squared, service length and its square, religion and region. Number of daughters regressions include the preceding covariates as well as fixed effects for total number of children. ***denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% and * at 10%. APPENDIX 
